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HARMFUL USE OF HARMLESS ERROR
IN CRIMINAL CASES
INTRODUCTION
Not all trial errors justify reversal of a judgment on appeal. If
an error did not affect the trial's outcome, appellate courts may
label it harmless I and, in the interest of judicial economy,2 affirm
the decision below. Errors that may have swayed the verdict war-
rant reversal. 3  Some errors, however, are so egregious that
courts will automatically reverse the judgment below. 4  Further-
1 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946); Mause, Harmless Con-
stitutional Error: The Implications of Chapman v. California, 53 MINN. L. REv. 519, 519-20
(1969).
2 See R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970); Mause, supra note 1, at
519-20.
3 See Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). Sometimes other factors,
such as the fundamental nature of the right violated, call for reversal even if the error
could not have prejudiced the defendant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
449-55, 480-81 (1971) (reversible constitutional error for interested party to issue otherwise
justifiable warrant). See also In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("'justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice"'). Consider, for example, the right to appear pro se as described in
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). After dwelling at length on the value of preserv-
ing individual dignity and freedom of choice (id. at 821-26), the Court reversed for an
error that was per se nonprejudicial. Some convictions merit reversal because certain offi-
cial improprieties cannot be tolerated regardless of any actual prejudice to the defendant.
See United States v. Stewart, 576 F.2d 50, 56 (5th Cir. 1978) (knowing introduction of
confession in wake of Miranda violation merits reversal even if error harmless); United
States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (appellate courts should consider
prophylactic reversal to encourage prosecutors to behave).
Nevertheless, in reviewing errors that offend judicial sensibilities or deny a fundamen-
tal right, some appellate courts mistakenly focus on prejudice. In United States v. Boswell,
565 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 81 (1978), the Fifth Circuit held that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt for a trial judge, in violation of rule 25(a) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to leave the bench for four hours during jury argu-
ment. The defendants claimed that the trial court's failure to provide a statutorily compe-
tent judicial officer at all times during trial violated their sixth amendment right to trial by
jury. The court of appeals did not reach the merits of this claim because it found that the
error could not have prejudiced the defendants. Id. at 1342.
The Boswell court, however, failed to weigh all relevant considerations. An error such
as this might seriously tarnish the image of the judiciary. The court could have justified
reversal in the desire to discourage such irresponsible behavior and uphold the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure.
4 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967). Justice Stewart concurred,
noting that convictions tainted with coerced confessions, denial of counsel, prejudice of
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more, in criminal cases, where defendants' liberty and social in-
terests are at stake,5 appellate courts must apply the harmless
error doctrine with circumspection. 6  In these cases, the doctrine
should be "sparingly employed." 7
Recently, however, federal courts have increased their use of
the doctrine while simultaneously eroding its foundation.8 Some
have affirmed tainted convictions without recognizing that the er-
rors caused unmeasurable prejudice.9 Others have weakened the
standard of certainty required before the court may hold an error
harmless."0 This Note argues that courts should employ a strin-
gent standard of review for criminal trial errors1 ' and hold the
doctrine of harmless error inappropriate if they cannot fairly
measure harmlessness with the requisite certainty."2 Judicial
speculation as to unascertainable prejudice invites a miscalculation
that would doom the defendant to suffer the consequences of an
unjust conviction.
judge, or jury instructions embodying an unconstitutional presumption merit automatic
reversal. Id. at 42-44. See generally Mause, supra note 1.
Nonconstitutional errors may trigger the automatic reversal rule. For example, the
denial or impairment of the right to exercise peremptory challenges will cause reversal of a
subsequent conviction without a showing of prejudice. See United States v. Dellinger, 472
F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). See generally Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
5 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). See also Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless
Error, 59 VA. L. REV. 988, 991-98 (1973).
6 See Mause, supra note 1, at 520 ("uncertainty should almost always be resolved in
favor of the criminal defendant").
Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir. 1977). The Chapman court
stated: "The infusion of 'harmlessness' into error must be the exception, and the doctrine
must be sparingly employed. A miniscule error must coalesce with gargantuan guilt, even
where the accused displays an imagination of Pantagruelian dimensions." Id. at 1250. Pan-
tagruel is a Rabelaisian character famous for his extravagant and boorish sense of humor.
Because defendant's alibi approached implausibility, the Chapman court's image is not
phenomenologically felicitous.
6 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text infra.
9 See notes 64-109 and accompanying text infra.
10 See notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
"1 This Note will not deal extensively with civil errors. Because the civil litigant does
not ordinarily risk stigmatization and loss of freedom, a lesser standard of proof applies in
civil trials than in criminal trials. The standard employed in appellate review of civil errors
should be more relaxed as well. The high stakes in criminal cases demand greater certainty
before a conviction can take place or be upheld.
" See notes 64-109 and accompanying text infra. But see Saltzburg, supra note 5, at
1026. Saltzburg argues that the infinite variety of possible fact situations necessitates a
case-by-case analysis. Where the facts are unique, he is correct. But for many types of
errors, such as denial of counsel or an improper voir dire, the variation in the facts should
not change the ultimate result. Because these errors foster unmeasurable prejudice, the
conviction deserves automatic reversal.
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I
DANGERS OF HARMLESS ERROR
Historically, even a trivial error at trial resulted in reversal.' 3
Reversing courts typically explained that, in the event of error, a
losing party had a legal right to a new trial 14 and that any other
rule would force appellate courts to usurp the function of the
jury.'5 Although this rule afforded litigants maximum protection
from error, its exaltation of technicalities aroused opposition. 16 In
1919, Congress decreed that only errors that affected "the sub-
stantial rights of the parties" were reversible in federal court.' 7
Subsequent cases followed the legislative lead.' 8
The doctrinal pendulum has now swung in the opposite di-
rection. Commentators have repeatedly warned that increased
use 1 9 of harmless error analysis is inherently dangerous regard-
less of whether the errors violate the Constitution, statutes, or the
common law.2 °
13 See, e.g., Carver v. United States, 160 U.S. 553, 555 (1896) (reversal for erroneous
admission of second statement from dying declarant that her earlier declaration was true
"in every particular"); Williams v. State, 27 Wis. 402, 403 (1871) (reversal warranted be-
cause indictment described offense as "against the peace of the State" rather than "against
the peace and dignity of the State"). See generally R. TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 3-4; 1 J.
WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COM-
MON LAW § 21, at 367-68 (3d Ed. 1940). The rule of reversal applied to both civil and
criminal cases. Id.
14 See Sparks v. Oklahoma, 146 F. 371, 373 (8th Cir. 1906); 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note
13, § 21, at 368-69.
'" See Crease v. Barrett, I C.M. & R. 919, 933, 149 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1359 (Ex. 1835); 1
J. WIGMORE, supra note 13, §21, at 368-70.
16 See I J. WIGMORE supra note 13, § 21, at 370-75.
17 See Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181. The statute stated:
On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, writ of error, or motion for a new
trial, in any case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an
examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to technical
errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties.
Id. A similar formulation remains in effect. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976); FED. R. CRIM. P.
52. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless error rule applies in civil cases where "substantial
rights of the parties" are unaffected).
18 See 1 J. WIGMOtE, supra note 13, § 21, at 376-92 n. 17.
19 See notes 36-39 and accompanying text infra.
0 The commentators concentrate on constitutional errors. See, e.g., Field, Assessihfg the
Harmlessness of Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L.
REv. 15 (1976); Mause, supra note 1; Note, Harmless Constitutional Error, 20 STAN. L. REv.
83 (1967); Note, Principles for Applications of the Harmless Error Standard, 41 U. CHI. L. REv.
616 (1974).
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A. Dangers to Defendants
When appellate courts apply the doctrine of harmless error,
they redefine the impact of the law upon the defendant. Every
finding of harmlessness effectively curtails a defendant's rights;
from the defendant's standpoint, the right might as well not have
existed.2 1  Furthermore, application of the doctrine distorts the
appellate process; the court must determine the impact of an
error and not merely rule on its existence. Setting aside the bur-
den of persuasion issue,2 " affirming on harmless error grounds if
no prejudice is apparent does not differ from holding that an
inquiry into prejudice is relevant in deciding if any error oc-
curred.3
The doctrine of harmless error threatens to erode the distinc-
tion between guilt in fact and guilt in law. Even if a defendant is
guilty in fact, the state cannot punish him unless it can prove him
guilty at law. 24  Clever lawyering occasionally frees the culpable,
but society has judged this to be an acceptable cost of justice.2 5
Appellate courts that strongly emphasize independent evidence of
factual guilt as a justification for finding harmless error
underestimate a defense attorney's shrewd use of our system's
protective procedural mechanisms.
Finally, improper use of the harmless error doctrine may im-
pede interpretation of the law, leaving future defendants uncer-
tain about its meaning and impact. Appellate courts often abstain
21 Cf Bachner v. United States, 517 F.2d 589, 599 (7th Cir. 1975) (concurring opinion,
Stevens, J.) ("holding that the record discloses no 'fundamental defect which inherently
results in a complete miscarriage of justice' is ... merely another way of saying that the
Due Process Clause was not violated because the proceedings ... were not fundamentally
unfair"). This denial may be meaningless if the error was truly "harmless," that is, if it did
not prejudice the defendant in any way. However, such errors are exceptional; most offer
some opportunity for prejudice.
22 For discussion of the burdens of persuasion, see note 44 infra.
23 See note 87 and accompanying text infra.
24 See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 552 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.).
Justice Harlan, in regard to a constitutional violation, commented:
[RIeversal of this conviction is not a "penalty" imposed on the State for in-
fringement of federal constitutional rights. Reversal by this Court results, as
always, only from a decision that petitioner was not constitutionally proved
guilty and hence there is no legally valid basis for imposition of a penalty upon
him.
Id. The same principle applies to nonconstitutional errors. See Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 763-65 (1946).
25 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.) ("it is
for worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free").
1979]
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from reviewing a claim's merits on the ground that any error
would be harmless; 26 important issues, therefore, remain unde-
cided.27  The purpose of the harmless error doctrine is to save
the time and effort of retrial. It was not meant to shelter courts
from difficult questions of law.28
B. Dangers to the Judicial System
The doctrine of harmless error blurs the traditional separa-
tion of responsibility between appellate and trial courts. 29  In de-
26 See United States v. Lyman, 592 F.2d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Johnson, 572 F.2d 227, 235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978); United States v.
Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 390 (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bynum, 566 F.2d 914, 926
(5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 213 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
922 (1976).
A similar problem is the failure to even characterize the challenged action as a possible
error. See United States v. Stover, 565 F.2d 1010, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (probably un-
necessary and possibly coercive charge to jury amounted to "harmless superfluity").
In addition, courts typically devote very little space to explaining why an error is harm--
less. See, e.g., United States v. Searp, 586 F.2d 1117, 1125 (6th Cir. 1978).
27 See, e.g., Wright v. Estelle, 549 F.2d 971, 974 (1977), aff'd en banc per curiam mem.,
572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978). By finding harmless error, the Fifth Circuit dodged the
question of whether the defendant had a personal constitutional right to testify on his own
behalf. The en banc concurrence noted that in this case the "application of the harmless
error rule is nothing more than abdication of [the appellate court's] responsibility." 572
F.2d at 1072 n.2. See notes 100-102 and accompanying text infra.
28 See Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1072 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (concurring
opinion). See also United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244, 1256-57 (5th Cir. 1977) (en
banc) (concurring opinion, Hill, J.).
2s Ellis v. Short, 38 Mass. (21 Pick. 142, 145 (1838) ("This seems to us to trench upon
the province of the jury. How can the court know how much influence each particular
piece of evidence had upon the minds of the jury ... ?"); Crease v. Barrett, 1 C.M. & R.
919, 932, 149 Ens. Rep. 1353, 1359 (Ex. 1835) ("the Court would in a degree assume the
province of the jury"); Field, supra note 20, at 33-36. But see 1 J. WiGMoPE, supra note 13,
§ 21, at 369 "the theory of usurpation ... ignores the doctrine and the history of the jury's
function"). Wigmore argues that the jury's function is no more disturbed by an appellate
court's harmless error analysis then by the trial judge ruling on admissibility of evidence or
overturning a jury verdict. Id. at 370. He further states: "The 'usurpation,' if any, consists
in setting aside the verdict, not in confirming it." Id. This argument forgets that the ques-
tion is the validity of the verdict. A verdict founded upon improper evidence should not be
presumed valid. Wigmore also errs in equating trial court attempts to correct and control
the jury with the doctrine of harmless error. In keeping evidence from the jury or in
overturning a verdict, trial judges do not guess at how the jury would have reacted. Such
speculation is the heart of harmless error analysis. Furthermore, in a criminal proceeding,
the trial judge's supervision of the jury often protects the defendant whereas the doctrine
of harmless error allows a guilty verdict to stand despite error. In addition, although trial
judges cannot direct a verdict against a criminal defendant, the doctrine of harmless error
allows appellate courts to approximate that result.
542
19791 HARMLESS ERROR 543
termining whether the trier of fact would have reached the same
result in an error-free trial, the appellate court evaluates the fac-
tual strength of the appellee's case. 30 This trespass on the prov-
ince of the factfinder varies with the nature of the trial error.3 1
For example, a district attorney's improper introduction of a
noninflammatory piece of physical evidence during trial is a po-
tentially prejudicial error. Nevertheless, the reviewing court can
isolate the error's effect and determine its impact. This inroad on
the duty of the factfinder is an acceptable cost of the harmless
error doctrine. On the other hand, if the trial error cannot be
easily isolated or its impact easily gauged, the appellate court must
engage in "unguided speculation" 32 in order to reconstruct a
"proper" verdict.33 For example, to choose an extreme case, if a
biased jury decided the case, an appellate court would in effect
have to retry the case from the record. Usurping the factfinder's
function to this degree is an unacceptable price to pay for the
harmless error doctrine.
30 In criminal cases, the appellate court thereby intrudes upon the function of the jury.
Some appellate courts are sensitive to the problem of overreaching. Concurring in Bumper
v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968), Justice Harlan noted that, on appeal, "the test is
not and cannot be simply whether this Court finds credible the evidence against [the de-
fendant]. Crediting or discrediting evidence is the function of the trier of fact, in this case
a jury." Id. at 552. The court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946), stated
that: "it is not the appellate court's function .... to speculate upon probable reconviction
and decide according to how the speculation comes out.... Those judgments are exclu-
sively for the jury, given always the necessary minimum evidence .. " Id. at 763. Cf.
McQueen v. Swenson, 560 F.2d 959, 963 (8th Cir. 1977) ("Appellant's proof of prejudice
should not be defeated by the district court's low opinion of the credibility of relevant and
admissible testimony. This is for the jury.").
31 Some interference with the function of the trier of fact occurs in any inquiry into
prejudice from error. See Field, supra note 20, at 33-34. See, e.g., United States v. Matos,
444 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion, Pell, J.).
32 Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 491 (1978). In such a situation the court ceases
to act in a traditional judicial manner; it is not ruling on matters of law but is deciding
uncertain facts on appeal. For example, in United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 441 (9th
Cir. 1976), the Ninth Circuit rules that the exclusion of a defense witness was harmless
error because the witness would not have been "credible." The court observed that the
prospective witness was not disinterested and would likely have tried to exonerate the de-
fendant. Although the witness may have been biased, many other, more elusive factors
contribute to a witness' credibility. At best the court made an educated guess about the
witness' credibility; at worst it intuited. This kind of ruling is second-hand fact finding
without the guidance of any judicial standards.
33 Such a determination poses the risk that the court would find that the defendant was
guilty in fact rather than guilty in law. See notes 24-25 and accompanying text supra.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:538
A finding of harmless error also lessens the incentive of the
police or prosecutor to follow proper procedures.3 4  A harmless
error rule permits calculated error: a prosecutor may risk a slap
on the wrist in exchange for a more convincing case.3 5  A lenient
rule encourages a prosecutorial team to trifle with a defendant's
rights and is no more desirable than one which would reverse for
trivial errors.
II
THE CURRENT STATE OF THE
HARMLESS ERROR DOCTRINE
Despite its flaws, courts have invoked the doctrine of harm-
less error with ever increasing frequency. Changes in the standard
of review and categories of harmless error cases underlie this
trend.
A. Rising Numbers of Cases
In the last fourteen years, the total number of federal circuit
court cases considering harmless error has dramatically in-
creased.36
34 Justice Clark, while sitting by designation, once admonished that: "'Harmless error
is swarming around the 7th Circuit like bees. Before someone is stung, it is suggested that
the prosecutors enforce Miranda to the letter and that the police obey it with like diligence;
otherwise the courts may have to act to correct a presently alarming situation." United
States v. Jackson, 429 F.2d 1368, 1373 (7th Cir. 1970). See United States v. Stewart, 576
F.2d 50, 56 (5th Cir. 1978).
35 "Despite ... verbal slaps-on-the-wrist, prosecutorial misconduct continues to provide
.one of the most frequent contentions of defendants on appeal.' Our experience thus
suggests that courts must begin to take prophylactic considerations together with probable
prejudice to defendant in deciding whether to reverse." United States v. Freeman, 514
F.2d 1314, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Agee, No.
76-389-1, slip op. at 40 (3d Cir. Mar. 6, 1979) (dissenting opinion, Gibbons, J.) (by acknowl-
edging that trial judge used bad practice but holding error harmless, majority furnished
trial judges with "a blueprint for the partial evasion" of rulings in prior cases protective of
defendants' rights).
36 A LEXIS (registered trademark of Mead Data Central, Inc.) computer search on
March 22, 1979, of cases decided by federal courts of appeals between January 1, 1960 and
December 31, 1978 generated data for this section. The search produced 1,621 cases men-
tioning the phrase "harmless error" from the "CIRCUIT" file of the "GENERAL FED-
ERAL" library, which contains all cases from the second series of the Federal Reporter.
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CHART 1
INCREASE IN TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES
CONSIDERING "HARMLESS ERROR"
1960 1965 1970 1975
Year
Circuit Court Cases
"Harmless Error"
Cases
167
166
152
134
126
112
127
115
131
99
57
37
30
52
30
25
23
20
18
"Harmless Error"
Cases as Percent
of Total Cases
2.62
3.34
2.92
2.56
2.48
1.92
2.09
1.82
2.30
2.09
1.33
.93
.79
1.49
.87
.76
.72
.71
.63
1979]
200
0
S100
Year
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967
1966
1965
1964
1963
1962
1961
1960
Total
Cases
6370
4967
5211
5234
5085
5821
6076
6235
5688
4734
4290
3974
3815
3496
3444
3302
3184
2832
2865
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Total caseloads have increased as well, but in smaller proportion.
CHART 2
TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES
4000
0
, 3000
z
Cz 2000
0
1970
Year
Therefore, an increasing percentage of total cases in the courts of
appeals deal with harmless error.
This sampling technique is imprecise. It is overinclusive because it retrieves all cases
discussing harmless error, not merely those that hold an error harmless. It is underinclu-
sive because it does not identify cases that hold an error harmless without using the phrase
"harmless error." Therefore, this study does not measure with exactness the use of the
harmless error doctrine; it only suggests that this use is on the rise.
The cause of the apparent increase remains unclear. The most dramatic proportional
increase in harmless error cases, however, occurred during 1967-70, the approximate
period of two landmark Supreme Court cases on harmless constitutional error: Chapman
v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). Chap-
man and Harrington exposed constitutional errors to harmless error review; in addition
circuit courts may have read them as countenancing a more liberal use of the doctrine in
assessing all errors.
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CHART 3
"HARMLESS ERROR" CASES AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL CASES
4-
CzEn 3-
U,
CZC
0E 1-
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980
Year
For example, courts of appeals in only thirty of the 3,815 cases
(.78%) reported in 1966 engaged in analysis of harmless error. In
1977, 166 of the 4,967 cases (3.3%) reveal such analysis.
The frequency of harmless error cases varies among the cir-
cuits. 37 Although this unevenness in application may indicate dif-
37
DISTRIBUTION OF HARMLESS ERROR CASES AMONG
CIRCUITS (JAN. 1 to DEC. 31, 1978)
"Harmless Error"
Total "Harmless Cases as Percent
Reported Error" of Total
Circuit Cases Cases Reported Cases
D.C. 247 4 1.62
1st 310 7 2.26
2d 405 18 4.44
3d 614 9 1.47
4th 277 10 3.61
5th 1513 33 2.18
6th 671 21 3.13
7th 695 15 2.16
8th 646 16 2.48
9th 675 23 3.41
10th 296 10 3.38
Other 20 1 5.00
TOTALS 6370 167 Overall Avg. 2.62
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fering attitudes toward the propriety of employing the doctrine, it
could also simply reflect differing procedures for handling
caseloads within each circuit. 38  Some circuits, for example, report
a higher percentage of their cases than do other circuits. 39  Com-
parisons between the circuits, therefore, explain little.
B. Changing Standard of Certainty for a Finding of Harmless Error
Errors occur during both civil and criminal trials. In civil dis-
putes, which typically contest some form of property rights, trial
courts must decide which party has the better case. A reviewing
court may appropriately affirm only upon finding that the trial
error more-probably-than-not did not affect the judgment.40 A
" See Chanin, A Survey of the Writing and Publication of Opinions -in Federal and State
Appellate Courts, 67 L. LiB. J. 362, 362-67 (1974); Note, Written Opinions in the Modern Legal
System: Publish and Perish, 41 ALBANY L. REV. 813, 827-32 (1977). See also Morgan, The Fifth
Circuit: Expand or Divide, 29 MERCER L. REV. 885, 888-90 (1978).
'9 See REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES, [1977] ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 179 [hereinafter cited as 1977 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT].
One might expect busier courts to find a higher proportionate share of errors harm-
less in order to relieve their overcrowded dockets. However, a circuit-by-circuit comparison
of caseload per judge and frequency of harmless error does not support this hypothesis.
Comparison of Caseload to Use of Harmless Error
Cases Per Appellate Judge
Harmless Error Cases (Filings, Terminations, and
Circuit as Percent of Total (1978), Pending Caseload 1977)
D.C. 1.62 131
Ist 2.26 188
2d 4.44 299
3d 1.47 192
4th 3.61 237
5th 2.18 238
6th 3.13 203
7th 2.16 173
8th 2.48 140
9th 3.41 223
10th 3.38 161
1977 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 39, at 168. The correlation between these
two variables is weak. Moreover, the relationship between the Fifth Circuit's use of the
doctine and its caseload per judgeship seems inconsistent with the rough trend observable
for the other circuits. This example, however, illustrates the problems of intercircuit com-
parison because the Fifth Circuit employs a sophisticated screening procedure to expedite
its work. See Morgan, supra note 38, at 888-90.
40 Cf. Saltzburg,supra note 5, at 993 & n. 14 (appellate court may reverse upon finding that trial
error probably affected judgment).
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criminal case, on the other hand, implicates more important
rights, and proof of guilt must meet a higher standard-beyond a
reasonable doubt.41  Before affirming an error-tainted criminal
conviction, an appellate court should require a correspondingly
high degree of certainty.42
Criminal defendants benefit from both constitutional and
nonconstitutional procedural rights. The Supreme Court has ar-
ticulated different standards of review for criminal appeals de-
pending on the character of the error committed. In the
groundbreaking case of Chapman v. California,43 the Court held
that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." 44  Even violations of substantial con-
stitutional rights may be held harmless if the record contains in-
dependent, overwhelming evidence of guilt.45  The Court re-
quires a lesser degree of certainty to affirm convictions flawed by
nonconstitutional procedural errors. Under Kotteakos v. United
States,46 the reviewing court, after considering all aspects of the
case, need only find with "fair assurance" that the error did not
affect the trial's outcome.47
41 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970).
42 See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (dissenting opinion,
Robinson, J.).
43 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
44 Id. at 24. Another formulation of this test is that the beneficiary of the error must
show that there was no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the verdict. Id.
As Chapman illustrates, the prosecution bears the burden of proof in harmless error
analysis. This is consistent with the government's burden at trial to prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1341 (9th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (dissenting opinion, Hufstedler, J.). Nevertheless, because of their am-
biguity, several recent opinions suggest that the defendant-appellant should bear the bur-
den of proving prejudice. Id. & nn.19, 21. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text infra.
Such a shift of the burden would seem to be a radical and unfair development in harmless
error jurisprudence.
4' See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254 (1969).
46 328 U.S. 750 (1946). The error in Kotteakos violated a common law right. Some
doubt exists as to whether the Kotteakos or the Chapman standard applies to errors that in-
fringe upon statutory rights. See, e.g., United States v. Cavender, 578 F.2d 528, 534-35 (4th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 366 (D.C. Cir. 1976). The confusion over
the applicable standard may stem from Kotteakos itself, which suggested that errors infring-
ing a "specific command of Congress" should receive the same appellate scrutiny as con-
stitutional errors. 328 U.S. at 765.
47 328 U.S. at 764-65. See Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 282-83 (3d Cir. 1976);
United States v. Freeman, 514 F.2d 1314, 1320-21 (D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Bozza,
365 F.2d 206, 218 (2d Cir. 1966). Cf. United States v. Alston, 551 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)) ("serious doubts as to
whether a defendant was prejudiced by trial defects should be resolved in the defendant's
favor").
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These different standards of certainty, however, do not
necessarily yield different results. The beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard reverses more convictions than the fair assurance test,
but not many more. Some courts have restated the fair assurance
standard as the "high probability" standard advocated by former
Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court.48  Few
cases that meet the high probability test will fail to satisfy the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. 49  Furthermore, according
to Judge Weinstein,5" the high probability test approximates the
English test reported by Sir Frederick Lawton: "Could a reason-
able jury after a proper summing up have failed to convict? If the
answer is no, the verdict stands." 51 Under this standard, appel-
late courts judge nonconstitutional errors nearly as stringently as
constitutional violations. Indeed, one circuit court has reversed for
nonconstitutional error under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard. 52
The ultimate similarity of the Kotteakos and Chapman stan-
dards is not surprising. Although the standard of proof at trial
can make a difference in a given case, 53 trial judges do not appear
to have reached a consensus on the requisite probabilities. 54  Lack
of agreement has resulted in a narrow gap between the clear-
and-convincing and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards. 55  A
similar phenomenom may have occurred at the appellate level
where judges apply similar tests in second-hand review. Indeed,
'8 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 103[06], at 103-50 n.8 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE]. See United States v. Corey, 566 F.2d 429, 432
(2d Cir. 1977) ("A nonconstitutional error ... is harmless if it is 'highly probable' that the
error did not contribute to the verdict."); Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 283-84 (3d
Cir. 1976) (Traynor's "highly probable" test appropriate standard of appellate review).
Traynor defines three standards of certainty for determining the harmlessness of errors,
i.e., the chance that the error did not affect the trial's outcome: more probable than not,
highly probable, and almost certain. See R. TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 34-35.
"' See note 55 infra.
50 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, supra note 48, 103[06], at 103-50 n.8.
51 Lawton, The Criminal Trial in England: The Appeal of Verdicts, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 18, 1971,
at 4, col. 2.
512 See United States v. Duhart, 496 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967
(1974).
" See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958); United States v. Fatico, 458 F.
Supp. 388, 411-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens
of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299, 1309-11 (1977).
'4 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 409-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Underwood,
supra note 53, at 1309-11.
" In United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), Judge Weinstein
cites a survey of the judges in his district. That study indicated those judges believe the
probability associated with a clear and convincing standard of proof (roughly equivalent to
Traynor's highly probable standard) is 60-75% and that associated with a beyond-a-
reasonable-doubt standard is 76-95%.
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Judge Learned Hand doubted the ability of appellate judges to
distinguish between any of the appellate standards of review. 56
The convergence of the Kotteakos and Chapman standards is
theoretically justifiable as well. A convicted defendant loses his
liberty, reputation, and social standing regardless of the harmless
error's character. 57  Furthermore, the line between constitutional
and nonconstitutional errors is often very fine. 58  One commen-
tator argues persuasively that the Chapman test should govern re-
view of all errors in criminal cases:
It would make little sense to adopt [a standard of proof for
trial] which is designed to prevent criminal convictions if there
is even a reasonable doubt in the minds of jurors as to the guilt
of the person charged, and then on appeal to emasculate that
evidentiary standard by allowing a conviction to stand when the
trial court has violated evidentiary rules which might have in-
fluenced the jury by creating the requisite doubt.59
Unfortunately, some courts have eroded the standard of cer-
tainty for a finding of harmlessness.6" The Ninth Circuit, for
example, apparently retains the Chapman reasonable doubt test for
constitutional errors, but will not reverse nonconstitutional errors
if the error more-probably-than-not did not affect the jury's ver-
dict. 6' Because this test allows affirmance even if the certainty of
'6 See United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726
(1944), overruled on other grounds; United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
'7 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
58 Compare United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 176-78 (3d Cir. 1977) (jury in-
struction eliminating government's burden of proof on one element of offense held rever-
sible constitutional error under In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)) with United States v.
Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1977) (erroneous jury instruction omitting
one element of offense held nonconstitutional error). See also United States v. McClain, 545
F.2d 988, 1003 (5th Cir. 1977) (to deny jury opportunity to decide relevant factual ques-
tion would deprive defendants of constitutional right to jury trial).
59 Saltzburg, supra note 5, at 992. Accord, United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 126
(1977), aff'd en banc per curiam mem. by an equally divided court, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.)
(dissenting opinion, Swygert, J.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 351 (1978).
60 This erosion can be covert as well as overt. A covert weakening, however, is nearly
indiscernible because the standard is unquantifiable. For a general discussion of the quan-
tification problem, see J. MAGUIRE, J. WEINSTEIN, J. CHADBOURN & J. MANSFIELD, CASES AND
MATEIUALS ON EVIDENCE 871-73 (6th ed. 1973); 9J. WIGMOR, supra note 13, § 2497, at 325.
See generally United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), discussed in note 55
supra. Indeed, one judge has characterized the standards as "elusive and unhelpful." Id. at
410.
61 United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1977). Although it
approved a "more-probable-than-not" test, the Valle-Valdez court did not clearly state how
the test operates. Subsequent decisions by the Ninth Circuit explain that the reviewing
court can "affirm only if it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect
the verdict." United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1143 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
harmlessness is barely greater than fifty percent, courts using it
will affirm more convictions than those using the Kotteakos stan-
dard of "fair assurance." 62
The Ninth Circuit has erred in striking such a precarious
balance between defendants' rights and considerations of effi-
ciency. Conceptually, its test differs by less than a single percent-
age point from one that would affirm errors that probably did
prejudice a defendant. Of course, respect for the ultimate un-
quantifiability of prejudice should restrain affirmance in very
close cases. But even though the certainty target cannot be pin-
pointed, the Ninth Circuit plainly is aiming quite low.
The Ninth Circuit position raises serious problems. A low
standard of proof may tempt appellate courts to covertly adopt a
flexible position in reviewing harmlessness. The willingness to
"shave" only a few percentage points from an already weakened
standard may lead to unjust affirmances.6 3 Only a high standard
of proof in all aspects of a criminal case can protect against this
undesirable result.
C. Use of Harmless Error in Inappropriate Case Types
The marked increase in the use of the harmless error doc-
trine in recent years is attributable, in part, to the willingness of
courts to expand the doctrine's scope. In effect, some courts now
assess the harmlessness of an error even when they cannot fairly
calculate its effect on the trial's outcome. This journey through
the realm of unguided speculation as to an error's prejudicial ef-
fect is often inappropriate.
The rule of automatic reversal immunizes certain constitu-
tional errors from infelicitous harmless error analysis.64 The rule
manifests a recognition that certain errors pose great but incalcu-
lable harm to defendants. Such harm is not unique to constitu-
tional errors; some nonconstitutional errors merit application of
the rule as well because they also engender unmeasurable prej-
udice to defendants. 6  A harmless error decision in such cases
U.S. 927 (1978)(emphasis in original). See United States v. Indian Boy X, 565 F.2d 585,
592 (9th Cir. 1977).
62 The Kotteakos fair assurance standard and the high probability standard require ap-
proximately 60-75% certainty of harmlessness before allowing affirmance. See notes 40-59
and accompanying text supra.
63 See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
64 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23; id. at 42-44 (concurring opinion,
Stewart, J.). See note 4 supra.
65 Courts and commentators, however, usually discuss the rule solely in the context of
constitutional error. See, e.g., Note, supra note 20, 41 U. CHI. L. Rv., at 617-18. Cf United
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would not result from reasoned analysis, but from guesswork.
Application of the automatic reversal rule should turn upon the
nature of the harm to the defendant rather than the character of
the error. 66
1. Errors in Jury Instruction
Jury instructions are crucial to the trial process because, ide-
ally, they explain each question that the jury must answer. 67  Cer-
tain critical errors in jury instructions, such as omissions of ele-
ments of the crime,6 8 incorrect statements of law,6 9 instructions
with no basis in the evidence presented,7 0 and failure to inform
defense counsel of a jury's request for instruction, 71 merit au-
States v. Lee, 489 F.2d 1242, 1246 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("The harmless error doctrine
permits the Court to disregard any nonconstitutional error which does not affect the sub-
stantial rights of the defendant.").
" Such a rule would acknowledge that these errors infringe upon "substantial rights"
of defendants (see generally 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (1976)), regardless of whether the right is
constitutionally protected.
" See United States v. Alston, 551 F.2d 315, 321 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"8 Some courts hold that the harmless error doctrine is not applicable to jury instruc-
tions that omit elements of the crime. In United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.
1977), the Fifth Circuit declared:
When the jury is not given an opportunity to decide a relevant factual
question, it is not sufficient "to urge that the record contains evidence that
would support a finding of guilt even under a correct view of the law...." The
jury here was the only body that could have properly made the inference [to be
determined] and [an affirmance] by us ... would, by supplanting our determi-
nation for the jury's verdict, deprive the defendants of their right to a jury
trial.
Id. at 1003 (quoting United States v. Casale Car Leasing, Inc., 385 F.2d 707, 709 (2d Cir.
1967)). Accord, United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1974). But see
United States v. Stewart, 513 F.2d 957, 960 (2d Cir. 1975) (harmless error if clear evidence
on omitted element); United States v. Gilbert, 433 F.2d 1172, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (harm-
less error if evidence overwhelming). The Ninth Circuit has held that erroneous instruc-
tions will result in affirmance if, more probably than not, the error did not affect the
verdict. See United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 1977).
69 "The error involved a statement of the law, and there is no basis for the govern-
ment's speculation that the jury disregarded the judge's instruction to apply the law as
explained in the charge." United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1977).
Erroneous statements of law do not now require automatic reversal. See Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974) (reversal required only where there is probability that in-
correct standard in instruction prejudiced defendant).
70 See United States v. Breitling, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 252, 254-55 (1857) (instruction with
no basis in evidence confusing and warrants reversal); Morris v. United States, 326 F.2d 192,
195 (9th Cir. 1963). But see United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 115-16 (7th Cir. 1977)
(error harmless because jury could not find guilt beyond reasonable doubt on theory upon
which no evidence given), aff'd en banc per curiam mere. by an equally divided court, 578 F.2d
1219 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 351 (1978).
71 This failure violates rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See note 80
and accompanying text infra. Some courts have held the error harmless. See United States
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tomatic reversal because the amount of harm is potentially great
and necessarily uncertain. 72  Because a general verdict masks the
jury's rationale, no basis exists in the record for finding that the
jury disregarded these errors. 73
Unfortunately, the availability of harmless error analysis has
led reviewing courts astray. For example, in United States v.
Clavey,74 the Seventh Circuit first held harmless a jury instruction
allowing conviction on a theory upon which the prosecution in-
troduced no evidence.75 The jury found the defendant guilty of
the charge but their general verdict gave no hint as to the theory
they adopted. The Clavey majority reasoned that, because the jury
had no evidence before them, they could not have found the sus-
pect theory proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Judge Swygert
dissented relying on the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Breitling.76  Breitling had held that such instructions constitute
reversible error because they confuse jurors rather than aid in
their analysis. 77
The majority's argument rests heavily on the jury's ostensibly
independent comprehension and rationality. The jurors, however,
may have believed that instruction on a theory meant that suffi-
v. Breedlove 576 F.2d 57 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir.
1977), affd en bane per curiam mem. by an equally divided court, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 351 (1978).
72 Some errors in jury instructions are clearly harmless. See, e.g., United States v. Smith,
550 F.2d 277, 284 (5th Cir.) (harmless error to give instruction on charge not in indictment
when defendant found innocent of it), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 841 (1977). Moreover, courts
will frequently hold erroneous instructions harmless in light of curative events. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vega, 589 F.2d 1147, 1153 (2d Cir. 1978) (jury charge contained some
language that offset challenged language).
" See United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1977) (no basis for gov-
ernment's speculation that jury disregarded judge's erroneous instruction); United States v.
Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 176 (3d Cir. 1977) (cannot say with any certainty that jury did
not follow court's erroneous instructions). Judge Traynor has stated: "in the absence of
definitive studies to the contrary, we must assume that juries for the most part understand
and faithfully follow instructions. The concept of a fair trial encompasses a decision by
tribunal that has understood and applied the law to all material issues in the case."
R. TRAYNOR, supra note 2, at 73-74 (footnote omitted).
11 565 F.2d 111 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd en banc per curiam mem. by an equally divided court,
578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 351 (1978).
75 Id. at 115-16.
76 61 U.S. (20 How.) 252 (1857), discussed in United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111,
124-25 (7th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion), aff'd en banc per curiam nzem. by an equally divided
court, 578 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 351 (1978).
77 Id. at 254-55 (1857). See United States v. Easom, 569 F.2d 457, 459 (8th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Moynagh, 566 F.2d 799, 804 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 917
(1978); United States v. Benedetto, 558 F.2d 171, 175-76 (3d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 324-25 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); Morris v.
United States, 326 F.2d 192, 195 (9th Cir. 1963).
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cient evidence existed to support it. Indeed, the instructions gen-
erally puzzled the Clavey jury.7 8 Given documented jury confu-
sion, a reversal under Breitling was all the more appropriate.
A second nonconstitutional error complicated Clavey. Al-
though the jury requested additional instruction, the trial judge
neither informed the defense counsel of nor responded to the
request.7 9  The majority held that this inaction violated rule 43 of
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,"0 but found the error harm-
less. To reach this result, the court must have guessed at the cause
of the jurors' uncertainty and concluded that they had resolved all
doubts in favor of the defendant.81
The majority's position is plausible, but ultimately unpersua-
sive. The extent of jury confusion was unknown because the trial
judge stifled juror inquiry. Furthermore, only a mind reader
could ascertain whether the jury correctly interpreted the instruc-
tions it did receive. And, of course, the record could not disclose
whether the jury would have reached a different verdict if prop-
erly instructed. The doctrine of harmless error was patently in-
applicable in Clavey. Judgments flawed by those types of errors
merit automatic reversal.8 2
78 565 F.2d at 118-20.
79 Id. at 118-19.
80 Id. at 119-20. The trial judge unquestionably erred. See Rogers v. United States, 422
U.S. 35 (1975); Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946). The Rogers Court stated:
Federal Rule Crim. Proc. 43 guarantees to a defendant in a criminal trial the
right to be present "at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the
jury and the return of the verdict." Cases interpreting the Rule make it clear
.*. that the jury's message should have been answered in open court and that
petitioner's counsel should have been given an opportunity to be heard before
the trial judge responded.
422 U.S. at 39. The Bollenbach Court held: "Discharge of the jury's responsibility ... de-
pended on discharge of the judge's responsibility to give the jury the required guidance by
a lucid statement of the relevant legal criteria. When a jury makes explicit its difficulties a
trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy." 326 U.S. at 612-13.
81 565 F.2d at 119-20. In his dissent, Judge Swygert stated:
The majority strains to construct an apology for the judge's error, but at
best its hindsight effort is speculation and at worst a sophism. For example, the
majority speculates that the last two questions asked by the jury "appear" to be
related, and that when read together the final question "appears" to be only a
specific version of the one asked the night before. The majority then
hypothesizes that because the defendant was acquitted on certain (but not all)
counts to which the last question related, the judge's answer, if given, could not
have "produced a more favorable result for him." The majority apparently
rules out the possibility of a complete acquittal had the judge taken the steps
the majority says he should have taken.
Id. at 126 (dissenting opinion).
812 Keen v. United States, 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1977), provides a variant of the
C/avey problem. The trial judge in a civil case improperly allowed the introduction of an
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2. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants effec-
tive assistance of counsel. 3  Courts agree that an improper denial
of counsel at trial merits automatic reversal on appeal.8 4  The cir-
cuits are split, however, on the applicability of the harmless error
doctrine to cases involving ineffective assistance of counsel. Some
circuits have adopted a rule of automatic reversal-they do not
require a showing of actual prejudice.85 In what may amount to
a de facto automatic reversal rule, some circuits have placed the
burden on the government to demonstrate absence of prej-
udice. 8 6 Several circuits, applying different rationales, require
defendants to show actual prejudice.8 7  The Eighth Circuit jus-
admission of key facts with the instruction that the jury accept them as a matter of law.
The judge gave no subsequent instructions on the point. The Tenth Circuit found the
error harmless because the facts had been argued at trial. Even under the relaxed stan-
dards of civil cases (see notes 40-42 and accompanying text supra), the Tenth Circuit en-
gaged in unwarranted speculation and came to an unjustifiable result.
" U.S. CONsT. amend. 6. See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970);
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942). Before the sixth amendment was
applied to the states, ineffective assistance of counsel could amount to a denial of due
process in state trials. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446-47 (1940); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-71 (1932).
84 See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 & n.8 (1967) (dictum); id. at 43 (concur-
ring opinion, Stewart, J.); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). Cf. Castaneda-
Delgado v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 525 F.2d 1295, 1300-02 (7th Cir. 1975)
(denial of counsel at deportation proceedings never harmless error). Denial of counsel at
other critical stages in the criminal process may be harmless error. See, e.g., Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11 (1970) (remanding to determine if denial of counsel at prelimi-
nary hearing constituted harmless error).
85 See United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 865 n.1 (6th Cir. 1978); United States ex
rel. Healey v. Cannon, 553 F.2d 1052, 1057 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977);
Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit applies the
rule to cases where "counsel is prevented from discharging his normal functions." Cooper
v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1332 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc). Where the claim of ineffective
assistance rests on "specific acts and omissions of defense counsel at trial," however, the
defendant must show actual prejudice. Id. at 1327.
86 See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coles v. Peyton,
389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968). The District of Columbia Circuit may have misgivings
about this rule-DeCoster has yet to be finally decided after remand. See United States v.
DeCoster, No. 72-1283 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 19, 1976), vacated for en banc consideration, No. 72-
1283 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 1977).
'7 See Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1327 (9th Cir. 1978) (en banc), discussed in
note 84 supra; United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877, 880 (8th Cir. 1977); Haggard v.
Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666
(8th Cir. 1976); Thomas . Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 413-14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
868 (1976); United States ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 434 F.2d 1112, 1115 (3d Cir. 1970).
These courts have clouded the distinction between the tests for ineffective assistance of
counsel and harmless error. For example, in Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.
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tifies burdening the defendant by noting that "proof of prejudice
is usually more within [his] knowledge" 88 and argues that a
different rule would penalize the prosecution for acts beyond its
control.89 The Fifth Circuit has argued that it can only speculate
about the effect of a different attorney, and thus refuses to reverse
unless the facts indicate that counsel could have employed more
fruitful tactics. 90
The rationales advanced in support of a "proof of actual prej-
udice" rule are unpersuasive. Although ineffective assistance of
counsel always threatens irreparable harm to the defendant, the
record often does not reveal prejudice. 91 The record rarely
shows what tactics competent counsel might have employed; it
cannot show the impact that competent counsel may have had on
the trial's outcome. 92  A barren transcript coupled with defen-
1978) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit required the defendant to show that counsel was not
reasonably competent and, as part of his claim of error, demonstrate that counsel's errors
prejudiced his defense. Id. at 1331. Defendant need not demonstrate that he would have
been acquitted but for the error. Id. at 1333. Because defendant could not make the re-
quisite showing of actual prejudice, the court refused to find ineffective assistance of coun-
sel. Id.
In McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1974), the Eighth Circuit found inef-
fective assistance of counsel before assessing prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 218. The
court then explicitly engaged in harmless error analysis. Subsequent decisions have incor-
porated a prejudice criterion into the ineffectiveness of counsel test. See, e.g., Morrow v.
Parratt, 574 F.2d 411, 412-13 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877, 880
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Easter, 539 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1976). The circuit
continues to equate its prejudice requirement with harmless error analysis. See United
States v. Runge, No. 77-1315, slip op. at 6-8 (8th Cir. Feb. 13, 1979) (per curiam); Morrow
v. Parratt, 574 F.2d 411, 413 & n.2 (8th Cir. 1978).
Notwithstanding the mechanics of their rules, both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits en-
gage in harmless error analysis when they require a showing of prejudice. Under the usual
harmless error analysis, lack of prejudice results in affirmance despite error; under the
Eighth and Ninth Circuits' formulation, lack of prejudice results in no error. One possible
distinction between the analyses centers on the standard of proof: what constitutes a show-
ing of prejudice?
"8 See Thomas v. Wyrick, 535 F.2d 407, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868 (1976).
'9 See McQueen v. Swenson, 498 F.2d 207, 219 (8th Cir. 1974).
90 See Haggard v. Alabama, 550 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1977).
91 Recognizing this problem one circuit requires the government to show absence of
prejudice. See Unites States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973), discussed in note
86 and accompanying text supra.
92 For example, if counsel fails to investigate the facts or the law "the record may not
indicate which witnesses he could have called, or defenses he could have raised." Id. at
1204. See United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam). In
Thompson, the court rejected appellant's affidavits from witnesses who would have given
favorable testimony but who were not interviewed by defense counsel. Relying on the rec-
ord alone, the court found no "satisfactory basis for considering the issue of ineffective-
ness." Id. at 932.
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dant's own scant awareness of legal errors 93 may create an insur-
mountable barrier to proof of actual harm.94
Denial of counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel pose
the same threat-prejudice to the defendant that is substantial yet
difficult to prove. Indeed, "[t]he purpose of Gideon was not
merely to slapply criminal defendants with warm bodies, but
rather to guarantee reasonably competent representation." 95
Courts should extend the automatic reversal rule to ineffective as-
sistance cases, and thus draw them under the same protective
umbrella that now shelters denial of counsel claims. In short, the
automatic reversal rule should apply to every infringement of the
sixth amendment right to counsel.9"
3. Errors of Exclusion of Key Evidence
When appellate courts review wrongful exclusion of key evi-
dence at trial, they should apply the rule of automatic reversal
rather than engage in harmless error speculation. Assessing the
harmlessness of wrongful exclusion requires judicial appraisal of
both the content of the excluded evidence and its potential impact
upon the jury.97 The result of this analysis can only be the prod-
9' See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
94 Therefore, in evaluating effectiveness of counsel, courts should consider only readily
measurable factors, such as the attorney's preparation, performance, and loyalty; actual
harm to the defendant should not be relevant.
95 Cooper v. Fitzharris, 551 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd en banc, 586 F.2d
1325 (1978). The Supreme Court has found that complete absence of counsel is not a
prerequisite to finding denial of counsel. See Gedders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91
(1976) (refusal to permit defendant to consult with attorney during overnight recess be-
tween direct- and cross-examination violated sixth amendment right to assistance of coun-
sel); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. '853, 858, 862-65 (1975) (denial of right to make
summation at criminal trial violates sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel regard-
less of simplicity of case or strength of prosecution's evidence).
96 Courts that incorporate a prejudice requirement into their criteria for evaluating the
effectiveness of counsel (see note 87 supra) would have to eliminate this burden on the
defendant in order to be consistent with the underlying rationale of the automatic reversal
rule. That rule makes prejudice irrelevant.
The marked unwillingness of courts, even when confronted with obvious blunders, to
find a breach of attorney's duties will probably limit the impact of an automatic reversal
rule. See, e.g., United States v. Yelardy, 567 F.2d 863, 865 n.2 (6th Cir. 1978) (reasonable
belief in client's guilt diminishes counsel's obligation to investigate).
97 Appellate courts have less difficulty reviewing the wrongful admission of key evi-
dence. There, unlike in cases of exclusion, the evidence appears in the record and, there-
fore, the court need only determine impact. On the other hand, the improper restriction
of impeachment materials constitutes an intermediate case. Impeachment attempts to un-
dermine the credibility of properly admitted evidence. Hindrances to impeachment, such
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uct of guesswork. 8
The rule of automatic reversal is particularly appropriate
when the trial court excludes testimony of witnesses favorable to
the defendant.99 Appellate court attempts to assess the harmless-
ness of the exclusion of defendants' own testimony starkly reveal
the dangers of harmless error analysis. In Wright v. Estelle,100 for
example, the Fifth Circuit held that, even if the trial court had
denied the defendant his "personal constitutional right" to testify
on his own behalf, 10' the error was harmless because it "would not
as the prosecutor's failure to produce requested material or court's improper limitation of
cross-examination, produce more easily ascertainable harm than the omission of new, posi-
tive evidence favorable to the defendant. Nevertheless these errors pose serious problems
for appellate determination of prejudice. For example, the Supreme Court has called the
wrongful limitation of defense counsel's impeachment of a prosecution witness "a constitu-
tional error of the first magnitude." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 328 (1974) (quoting
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3 (1966)). Only when special circumstances ameliorate the
effects of the limitation will the courts hold the error harmless. See United States v. Price,
577 F.2d 1356, 1362 (9th Cir. 1978) (error harmless if evidence overwhelming and im-
peaching information entered record in another form); United States v. Mayer, 556 F.2d
245, 252 n.10 (5th Cir. 1977) (possible harmless error if impeachment impaired but not
denied); United States v. Duhart, 511 F.2d 7, 9-10 (6th Cir.) (error harmless if testimony
not that of key witness and other evidence of guilt overwhelming), cert. dismissed, 421 U.S.
1006 (1975). Impeachment evidence may do more than merely discredit other testimony
thus making prejudice even harder to measure. For example, in Johnson v. Brewer, 521
F.2d 556, 562 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit found reversible error in the trial court's
exclusion of impeachment evidence profferred to show an attempt by an informant-the
prosecution's only witness-to frame a different defendant in a similar case and thus to
suggest that the witness did so in this case.
8 Courts can review trivial omissions with greater certainty. A good example is an
omitted document of definite content that could have had little subjective impact on a jury.
See United States v. Liddy, 542 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
'9 See, e.g., Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1255-56, 1259 (7th Cir.) (improper
exclusion of psychiatric testimony offered to show that defendant lacked capacity to form
requisite intent for first degree murder conviction, held constitutional error and not harm-
less), cert. dismissed, 99 S. Ct. 43 (1978); United States v. McClure, 546 F.2d 670, 672-73
(5th Cir. 1977) (reversible error to exclude testimony possibly favorable to defendant). But see
United States v. Wood, 550 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1976) (testimony wrongly excluded but
no prejudicial error because witness would not have been credible).
A similar problem arises when the prosecution fails to disclose the existence of a
favorable defense witness. In Jackson v. Wainwright, 390 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1968), the
court refused to "assume that this evidence would not have affected the jury's delibera-
tions" (id. at 298-99) and reversed, reasoning that "nondisclosure ... even when there was
no showing of the prosecution's bad faith, offends the fundamental conceptions of a fair
trial essential to due process" (id. at 299).
100 549 F.2d 971 (1977), aff'd en banc per curiam mem., 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 99 S. Ct. 617 (1978).
101 It is unclear whether a personal constitutional right to testify exists; neither the panel
opinion nor the en banc dissent cited controlling authority. The panel opinion assumed
arguendo that the trial court had committed a constitutional error, and applied the Chap-
man standard, which dicates reversal unless the error is harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. at 974. The trial court may not have erred. Defense counsel prevented the
defendant, against his wishes, from testifying. The attorneys did not tell the court of this
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have altered the verdict" in light of the overwhelming evidence of
guilt.' 02
The Fifth Circuit displays unwarranted confidence in its abil-
ity to measure prejudice.'0 3  The record, however, seldom pro-
vides sufficient information from which to posit the content of
defendant's testimony.' 0 4  Furthermore, that testimony might
have had great impact upon the trier of fact.' 0 5 In United States
v. Cavender,'0 6 the Fourth Circuit noted that the defendant is
often in the best position to offer exculpatory testimony and that
courts cannot easily say he could not influence the jury. 10 7 A
conflict, and the defendant was convicted. Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1074 (5th Cir.
1978) (en banc) (dissenting opinion, Godbold, J.). Wright's attorneys may simply have
employed a tactical device. See id. at 1072 (concurring opinion). Wright avoided deciding
this hard question by using the harmless error doctrine. See notes 26-28 and accompanying
text supra.
102 549 F.2d at 974.
103 The judges of the Fifth Circuit occasionally take pains to emphasize that courts
should invoke the doctrine of harmless error sparingly in light of its potential hazards. See,
e.g., Chapman v. United States, 547 F.2d 1240, 1250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 908
(1977). A review of the circuit's harmless error decisions, however, reveals an often aggres-
sive attitude toward its ability on appeal to determine the amount of prejudice the defen-
dant suffered as a result of trial errors. For example, the Fifth Circuit requires that an
appellant show actual prejudice to establish ineffective counsel. See Haggard v. Alabama,
550 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir. 1977); notes 83-96 and accompanying text supra. The Fifth
Circuit, in addition, willingly judges, based on the paper record, the relative credibility of
witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626 (5th Cir. 1978). In Beasley, a
crucial point in the prosecution's case depended solely on the testimony of two witnesses,
one of whose testimony was subsequently stricken. The Fifth Circuit was left to balance the
"convincing" testimony of the remaining witness against Beasley's personal denial. Id. at
633. Even though the witness had borne the defendant's child (id. at 627) and may not
have been entirely disinterested, the court affirmed the conviction.
Because an appellate court cannot observe the demeanor of trial witnesses, it should
not decide close questions of witness credibility. The Fifth Circuit has produced a large
body of harmless error authority (note 37 supra) and the judges have undoubtedly gained
great familiarity with the doctrine. Although experience could make them more comfort-
able in making the fine factual distinctions required in harmless error cases it is often im-
possible to calcu!ate the precise effect an error may have had on a jury. Frequent use of
harmless error could also cause insensitivity to trial errors that, although not prejudicing
this defendant, could mar the appearance of justice. The Fifth Circuit, for example, called
harmless a federal judge's absence from the bench during four hours of jury argument. See
United States v. Boswell, 565 F.2d 1338, 1341-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 81 (1978).
See also note 96 supra.
i04 In Wright, for example, the defense attorney suspected that the defendant's tes-
timony would have conflicted with other testimony. 549 F.2d at 974. The defendant, how-
ever, denied that his story would have been substantially different. Id.
oI See A. AMSTERDAM, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES § 390, at
1-386 (3d ed. 1974) (in many cases accused's testimony may provide direct factual support
of defense theory).
106 578 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1978).
107 Id. at 534-35. The Cavender court found that defendant did not testify because of the
trial courCs erroneous ruling that his remote prior convictions would be admissible to im-
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defendant's demeanor is more critical than that of other witnes-
ses. 108  When the jury focuses on his credibility as a witness, they
judge him personally. Moreover, if the trial court prevents the
defendant from testifying on his own behalf, he not only loses the
chance to tell his story to the jury, but faces the possibility that the
jury will draw a negative inference from his failure to testify. 0 9
peach his testimony without a finding of their probative value. Id. at 529-30. The court
held that the error could not be harmless under either the Kotteakos standard for non-
constitutional errors or the Chapman standard for constitutional errors. Id. at 535.
108 In his dissent in Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), Judge
Godbold noted:
[T]reatment of the issue [here] as an evidentiary problem is appropriate if the
excluded testimony is that of a mere witness. Judges can, with a reasonable
degree of assurance, identify and sort out merely trivial or cumulative evidence
and form a reasoned judgment on possible impact upon the jury of what it
erroneously heard or failed to hear.... Where the error is in keeping the de-
fendant from the stand the judge can consider the content of what the defen-
dant might have said the same as for a nonparty witness. But he cannot weigh
the possible impact upon the jury of factors such as the defendant's willingness
to mount the stand rather than avail himself of the shelter of the Fifth
Amendment, his candor and courtesy (or lack of them), his persuasiveness, his
respect for court processes. These are elusive and subjective factors, even
among persons who might perceive and hear the defendant, but more signifi-
cantly, they are matters neither communicated to an appellate judge nor suscep-
tible of communication to him. Appellate attempts to appraise impact upon the
jury of such unknown and unknowable matters is purely speculative.
Id. at 1081-82 (footnote omitted). Judge Godbold also encouraged reversal in order to
maintain proper judicial appearances. Id. at 1081.
Edward Bennett Williams once wrote that:
When [the defendant takes the stand] you and I, of course, know that this is
the most important part of any criminal case. The spotlight of attention is on
him. He is the chief actor in the drama of any criminal trial and the impression
that he makes on the jury will be the most important single factor in determin-
ing whether or not he is convicted or acquitted.
He dwarfs in importance every other figure in the trial. He must create an
atmosphere of understanding and sympathy and warmth in the minds and
hearts of the twelve jurors.
Williams, The Trial of a Criminal Case, 29 N.Y. ST. B. A. BULL. 36, 42 (1957). See A.
AMSTERDAM, supra note 105, § 390, at 1-386 to -387 (defendants who do not testify forego
opportunity to appeal directly and personally to sympathy of jurors).
109 Jurors often construe defendant's failure to testify as an indication that he has some-
thing to hide. A. AMSTERDAM, supra note 105, § 390, at 1-386. A survey conducted by the
American Institute of Public Opinion revealed that 71% of the people questioned saw the
defendants failure to testify as an indication of guilt. See Note, To Take the Stand or Not to
Take the Stand: The Dilemma of the Defendant with a Criminal Record, 4 COLUM. J. OF L. AND
SOC. PROB. 215, 221 (1968). Not surprisingly then, the vast majority of judges and lawyers
believe that the defendant generally increases his chances of acquittal by testifying. Id. at
221.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
D. The Supreme Court's Harmless Error Boundary: Holloway v. Arkan-
sas and Errors of Pervasive Prejudice
In Holloway v. Arkansas,110 the Supreme Court laid the foun-
dation for constructing principled categories of errors that require
automatic reversal. The three Holloway defendants made timely
motions at trial for appointment of separate counsel, arguing that
their shared, court-appointed attorney could not provide each of
them with effective assistance of counsel. Defendants alleged that
counsel possessed confidential information that would force him
to represent conflicting interests. The trial judge denied the mo-
tions without taking adequate steps to investigate their bases"'
and later prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining each
defendant on behalf of the other defendants. The jury convicted;
the Supreme Court reversed. 1 2  The Court followed Glasser v.
United States, 113 interpreting it to hold that "whenever a trial court
improperly requires joint representation over timely objection re-
versal is automatic." 114
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, gave three
interrelated reasons for rejecting harmless error analysis. First,
prejudice is presumed to flow from improper joint representa-
tion." 5 Second, "the assistance of counsel is among those 'con-
stitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can
never be treated as harmless error"' 1.6 -once a court finds coun-
sel ineffective the defendant need not show actual prejudice to
obtain reversal. 1 7  Finally, the error of requiring joint represen-
110 435 U.S. 475 (1978).
11 Precisely what steps are adequate remains unclear. Id. at 493 (dissenting opinion,
Powell, J.).
112 The Arkansas Supreme Court had affirmed the trial court's result. See Holloway v.
State, 260 Ark. 250, 539 S.W.2d 435 (1976).
113 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
114 435 U.S. at 488.
"1 Id. at 489.
116 Id. (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). But cf. Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1969) (remand to determine whether denial of counsel at
preliminary hearing prejudicial).
117 The District of Columbia Circuit has interpreted Holloway as saying that a sixth
amendment violation can never be harmless. United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 491
n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Holloway itself, however, waffles on this issue. At one point, the
Court said that "when a defendant is deprived of the presence and assistance of his attor-
ney, either throughout the prosecution or during a critical stage in, at least, the prosecution of
a capital offense, reversal is automatic." 435 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). The question may
still be open for noncapital cases, but the severity of the offense does not seem to be a
logical distinguishing point.
Some circuits have attempted to restrict Holloway's holding. The First Circuit reads
Holloway as demanding a slight showing of prejudice. See United States v. DiCarlo, 575
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tation of conflicting interests may not produce identifiable prej-
udice. The harm caused by the impairment of counsel's effec-
tiveness, unlike that of discrete trial errors, may not appear in the
record. Hence, judges cannot measure prejudice in an "intelligent,
evenhanded" manner: 118
It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the
prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake cer-
tain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing
available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact
of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to
assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's op-
tions, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtu-
ally impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error
here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.1"9
Holloway's rationale naturally extends beyond the sixth
amendment: 120 it suggests that a rule of automatic reversal should
F.2d 952, 957 (1st Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 115 (1978). In Reynolds v. Mabry, 574
F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1978), the Eighth Circuit postulated that Holloway demands automatic
reversal for ineffectiveness of counsel only if the plaintiff establishes that the attorney has a
conflict of interest. Id. at 981. The Reynolds court considered prejudice relevant even in
that case. Id. at 981 n.5. In restricting the rule of automatic reversal, the Eighth Circuit is
consistent with its earlier ineffective assistance of counsel cases. See note 87 and accompany-
ing text supra. The limiting distinctions made by these circuits are inconsistent with the
rationale of Holloway. If counsel is ineffective during trial, it matters not why. The defen-
dant suffers whether his counsel is incompetent or has conflicting interests. See notes 83-96
and accompanying text supra.
118 435 U.S. at 490. An earlier Supreme Court case had held that denial of counsel at a
crucial pleading stage could not be harmless error because the "degree of prejudice can
never be known." Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961). Nevertheless in United
States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066, 1070 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 995 (1976), the
Third Circuit found the improper denial of counsel at a hearing to withdraw a guilty plea
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because defendant alleged neither that he was inno-
cent nor that his original plea was involuntary and clearly could not withdraw the plea.
Turning the speculation argument around, the Crowley court refused to assume new coun-
sel could have called old counsel and shown the old plea to be improper because nothing
in the record would indicate' it possible. Id. at 1071. But cf. United States v. Williams, 544
F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir. 1976) (failure to appoint required number of counsel raises
irrebuttable presumption of prejudice). See also United States v. Carrigan, 543 F.2d 1053,
1056 (2d Cir. 1976) (lack of satisfactory judicial inquiry into joint representation shifts
burden of proof on question of prejudice to government).
"19 435 U.S. at 490-91.
120 Several judges have reached conclusions similar to Holloway's in cases outside of the
sixth amendment context. See Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1978) (en
banc) (dissenting opinion, Godbold, J.) (harm from preventing defendant from testifying
cannot be assessed on appeal because impossible to know what effect testimony may have
had on jury); United States v. Clavey, 565 F.2d 111, 126 (7th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opin-
ion, Swygert, J.) (majority's conclusion that jury resolved uncertainty and confusion with
respect to instructions such that further instruction by the judge could not have produced
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apply to those fundamental, pervasive errors that have uncertain
prejudicial impact. 121  Courts may employ harmless error analysis
in cases involving such errors as improper introduction of inad-
missible evidence. Because such errors have fairly narrow and
specific effects, appellate courts can confidently evaluate their
harmlessness. 122  But when appellate courts cannot isolate the ef-
fects of an error, such as in cases of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel' 23 and factfinder bias, 2 4 they should reverse.
This reasoning should be carried further. For instance, any
finding of ineffective assistance of counsel merits automatic rever-
sal; the harm suffered by the defendant is the same, regardless of
whether it results from a conflict of interest or his counsel's in-
competence. Some types of isolated, discrete errors may also cause
unmeasurable prejudice because of, for example, their inflam-
matory nature. 25  These errors should receive the same treat-
ment that pervasive errors receive. The rule of automatic reversal
should be extended to all errors, whether or not pervasive or con-
stitutional, that result in unascertainable prejudice. 126
more favorable result for the defendant based upon assumptions not fact), aff'd en banc per
curiam mem. by an equally divided court, 578 F.2d 1219, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 351 (1978). Cf.
United States v. Matos, 444 F.2d 1071, 1074-75 (7th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion, Pell,
J.) (if prosecutor's statement possibly caused one juror to disbelieve defendant, then error
reversible; otherwise appellate court indulges in speculation).
121 435 U.S. at 490. See, e.g., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24-26 (1967). The
Holloway Court emphasized the uncertainty of prejudice. Apparently contemplating fun-
damental errors that damage the appearance of justice, the Court also noted that certain
errors require automatic reversal "'even if the defendant was clearly guilty."' 435 U.S. at
489 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 43 (1967) (concurring opinion, Stewart,J.)).
122 Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504-05, 512-13 (1976) (forcing defendant to stand
trial in prison uniform reversible constitutional error unless no objection made).
123 See United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (harmless error
doctrine inapplicable to sixth amendment violations). But see Reynolds v. Mabry, 574 F.2d
978, 981 & n.5 (8th Cir. 1978).
124 See Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1927) (reversible violation of due process for
interested judicial official to try cases). But cf. United States v. Staszcuk, 417 F.2d 53, 60
n.20 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975) (without finding error, court
disapproved of trial judge's failure during voir dire to make inquiries that would help
ensure unbiased jury).
125 Isolated errors may cause unmeasurable prejudice. See Miller v. North Carolina, 583
F.2d 701, 708 (4th Cir. 1978) (prosecutor's racially prejudicial closing remarks held con-
stitutional error and required automatic reversal because potential for prejudice too great).
126 The development of principled categories of errors for which harmless error analysis
is appropriate would avoid the uncertainty and nonuniformity resulting from case-by-case
determinations. But see United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331, 338 (2d Cir. 1976) (harmless
error a relative term requiring case-by-case analysis), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 430 U.S.
934 (1977).
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of harmless error conserves judicial resources
by obviating retrial for trivial mistakes. The doctrine's role in
criminal cases, however, has expanded to include parts that it is
ill-suited to play. Harmless error analysis is inappropriate for er-
rors with intrinsic but unmeasurable prejudice. A rule of automa-
tic reversal should apply to errors such as improper jury instruc-
tions, infringements of the right to effective counsel and exclusion
of key evidence.
Nevertheless, defendants on appeal must always be aware of
the doctrine's pervasive influence. Even a rule of automatic rever-
sal imperfectly guarantees defendants' rights against appellate
neglect. Courts could readily circumvent such a rule by not find-
ing error at all and substituting mere disapproval of an improper
practice.127 The ultimate safeguard lies in enhanced judicial sen-
sitivity to the extraordinary dangers of the harmless error doc-
trine along with acceptance of a rule of automatic reversal in ap-
propriate cases.
Donald A. Winslow
127 This phenomenon has occurred with voir dire and peremptory challenge practices.
Ostensibly, the defendant need not show prejudice to obtain reversal if the trial judge
improperly limits his questioning of prospective jurors during voir dire or improperly im-
pinges his right to disqualify jurors by peremptory challenge. See United States v.
Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 367 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 970 (1973). See generally
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892). Yet some courts have affirmed despite disapproving the improper voir dires or
other limitations on peremptory challenges and without clearly finding error. See United
States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 378-79 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977) (better
practice to disqualify potentially biased juror for cause and save peremptory challenge for
defendant); United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 60 n.20 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 837 (1975) (disapproval of trial judge's refusal to ask relevant questions during
voir dire). Appellate disapproval of trial court actions resembles a harmless error finding.
Each "doctrine" operates on a nonprejudicial trial court "error"; the appellate court at-
tempts to provide guidance for future cases without disturbing the result of the instant
case. Both doctrines are apposite only if the reviewing court can accurately measure the
error's prejudice. If prejudice is unmeasurable due to the nature of the impropriety, appel-
late courts cannot, through disapproval or harmless error, properly 'circumvent reversal.
